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Articles
Ethical Impulses From the Death Penalty:
"Old Sparky's" Jolt to the Legal Profession*
Joseph W. Bellacosa**
In People v. Davis,' New York's then-extant death penalty
statute was declared unconstitutional. Chief Judge Breitel dis-
sented and voted to uphold the legislative enactment, but
powerfully added:
Speaking for myself alone among the dissenters I find capital
punishment repulsive, unproven to be an effective deterrent (of
which the James case itself is illustrative), unworthy of a civilized
society (except perhaps for deserters in time of war) because of the
occasion of mistakes and changes in social values as to what are
mitigating circumstances, and the brutalizing of all those who
participate directly or indirectly in its infliction. This has been a
* This article is adapted from the Dyson Lecture given on October 26, 1993 by
the author at Pace University School of Law as the Eighth Annual Dyson
Distinguished Lecturer Series.
** Associate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. The author acknowl-
edges with appreciation the research and assistance of his Senior Law Clerk,
Donna Marie Werner, in the preparation of this article.
1. 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 998 (1978). Davis was decided together with People v. James, 43 N.Y.2d 17,
371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 914 (1978).
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lifelong view buttressed by over 40 years of experience as prosecu-
tor, counsel to the Governor entailing 81 applications for commu-
tation of capital sentences, Judge, member of the "National Crime
Commission", witness before the British Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment, and member of the American Law Institute
and its Advisory Committee on the Model Penal Code. In all of
these roles, when appropriate, I actively resisted viewing capital
punishment as a proper or useful sanction for civilian crime. 2
Regardless of categorical views for or against the death
penalty, there can be little doubt that the subject presents per-
plexing ethical issues, particularly for attorneys and the legal
profession. Lawyers, whose societal role includes serving as of-
ficers of the court while representing clients, have also been
characterized as guardians of justice. The connotations of those
titles and responsibilities make for one tough vocation.
Preliminarily, I emphasize that my expressions should not
be construed as harboring any explicit or disguised predisposed
views on the legality or constitutionality of capital punishment.
My options and personal prerogatives in that regard are se-
verely restricted and must be reserved against the possibility
that my judicial responsibility requires that I rule on such mat-
ters in the future.3 Judicial ethics require no less, for judges are
obligated to avoid putting themselves in situations that might
likely necessitate recusal.4 In a nicely balanced intellectual and
professional tension, however, judicial ethical norms also en-
courage judges to speak out and write on important jurispru-
dential issues with the objective of reform in the justice
system.5
So, the aim of this Dyson Lecture is to ensnare my listening
and reading audience into the intriguing and important dis-
course and web surrounding some of the professional ethical di-
lemmas and implications of the death penalty. I have selected
some historical commentary on the death penalty in New York,
and the discussion of some spin-off aspects focuses especially on
the quality and resources of defense representation and availa-
2. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d at 39 n.*, 371 N.E.2d at 468, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 747-48 (Brei-
tel, C.J., dissenting).
3. N.Y. JurD. LAw app., CODE OF JUDIcLAL CONDUCT Canon 4 (McKinney 1992
& Supp. 1994).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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bility of thorough or even adequate professional services to indi-
gent death row inmates. I also comment in this central ethical
context about the humaneness of contemporary methods of exe-
cution and the review procedures that attend such
circumstances.
Having set the stage with Judge Breitel's trenchant dissent
in Davis, I add a selection from an outstanding book which I
read in the summer of 1993, Dead Man Walking,6 by Sister
Helen Prejean, C.S.J. Her ministry, which led her to act as
friend and spiritual advisor to death row inmates in Louisiana,
caused her to write:
Albert Camus' "Reflections on the Guillotine" is for me a moral
compass on the issue of capital punishment .... "Society proceeds
sovereignly to eliminate the evil ones from her midst as if she were
virtue itself Like an honorable man killing his wayward son and
remarking: 'Really, I didn't know what to do with him'. . . . To
assert, in any case, that a man must be absolutely cut off from
society because he is absolutely evil amounts to saying that soci-
ety is absolutely good, and no one in his right mind will believe
this today."7
Using Camus further, Sister Prejean concludes:
In sorting out my feelings and beliefs, there is, however, one piece
of moral ground of which I am absolutely certain: if I were to be
murdered I would not want my murderer executed. I would not
want my death avenged. Especially by government - which can't
be trusted to control its own bureaucrats or collect taxes equitably
or fill a pothole, much less decide which of its citizens to kill.8
In New York, the Legislature has tried unsuccessfully
eleven times to enact a constitutional death penalty statute to
replace the remnant of the one struck down in 1984 in People v.
Smith.9 The old statute was barely breathing anyway, after
6. HELEN PREJEAN, C.S.J., DEAD MAN WALKING (1993). Dead Man Walking
has been described in one review as the death penalty's equivalent to Rachel Car-
son's Silent Spring, the book of the early 1960s that propelled the world's aware-
ness to environmental concerns. Raymond A. Schroth, Book Review, AMERICA,
Sept. 18, 1993, at 20 (reviewing HELEN PREJEAN, C.S.J., DEAD MAN WALKING
(1993)).
7. PREAN, supra note 6, at 21-22 (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 21.
9. 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1227 (1985). Smith was serving a life sentence for murder when he killed a
1994]
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People v. Davis.10 Eleven times Governor Cuomo vetoed the leg-
islative initiative, and veto overrides have failed every time as
well. New York's minority status, as one of only a dozen or so
states without a death penalty, is not new, however.
In 1835, New York was only the second state to remove ex-
ecutions from public view. 1 This was done to prevent "the often
disorderly and sometimes violent conduct of crowds stirred up
by anticipation of the executions and by the spectacle itself."12
This public order or sensibilities rationale semi-secreted the
procedure, obviating public appraisal and confrontation of the
consequences, for when "the torture was visible," it was impos-
sible to ignore the fact of a killing. Society's choice to keep the
act invisible and anonymous (the devices include masked execu-
tioners, one set of blank bullets, elimination of judicial signa-
tures on death warrants, small witness teams and the like)
surely connotes an ironic and macabre twist of fate and uncom-
fortableness despite public bravado. George Bernard Shaw, in
his great play, Saint Joan, puts these salient words into the role
of Chaplain Stogumber:
corrections officer. Id. at 50, 468 N.E.2d at 882, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 708. In holding
that New York's mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional because it failed to
.provide for the consideration of individual circumstances," id. at 78, 468 N.E.2d at
898, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 725, the Court of Appeals relied in part on the rationale of the
United States Supreme Court:
[A] statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving in-
dependent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character and rec-
ord and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the
risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call
for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that
risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Id. at 74, 468 N.E.2d at 895, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 722 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 605 (1978)).
10. 43 N.Y.2d 17, 371 N.E.2d 456, 400 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 998 (1978). The last execution in New York occurred in 1963. Robert M.
Bohm et al., Current Death Penalty Opinion in New York State, 54 ALB. L. REv.
819, 820 (1990). The case was People v. Mays, 13 N.Y.2d 784, 192 N.E.2d 173, 242
N.Y.S.2d 217 (1963), cited in WILLIAM J. BowERs, LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH As PUN-
ISHMENT IN AMERICA, 1864-1982 471 (1984). In 1984, when the Court of Appeals
struck down the death penalty in Smith, 63 N.Y.2d at 79, 468 N.E.2d at 898, 479
N.Y.S.2d at 725, there was only one death row inmate in New York. Id. at 50,468
N.E.2d at 881, 479 N.Y.S.2d at 708. In contrast, in 1991, there were 2,412 death
row inmates in the United States. Bobim, supra, at 820 n.4.
11. Bohm, supra note 10, at 819.
12. Id. (quoting BowERs, supra note 10, at 8).
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I tell my folks they must be very careful. I say to them, 'If you
only saw what you think about you would think quite differently
about it. It would give you a great shock.... I did a very cruel
thing once because I did not know what cruelty was like. I had
not seen it, you know. That is the great thing: you must see it....
I saw [Joan] actually burned to death. It was dreadful: oh, most
dreadful. But it saved me. I have been a different man ever
since.13
New York marked its special place in death penalty annals
again in 1890 when, to insure an instantaneous and painless
death, it became the first state to electrocute capital offenders. 14
Regrettably, New York also appears to hold the dubious distinc-
tion of having executed more innocent individuals than any
other state - up to now.15 At least eight men have been wrong-
fully executed in New York according to one recent account. 16
Indeed, in this century alone in "civilized" America, the claim is
made that at least 417 innocent people were convicted of capital
offenses, 23 of whom were executed.' 7 An unidentified colum-
nist in a recent New Yorker commentary characterized this phe-
nomenon as the creation of a second homicide victim.' Instead
of righting a wrong, a new second, cloned wrong emerges. We
might entitle the hypothetical case, The People v. The People!
These figures are even more disturbing when one realizes that
between 1976 and 1990 perhaps more than half of capital cases
reviewed by federal courts were reversed in the exercise of their
last chance, last gasp, collateral habeas corpus review power. 19
In that light on this issue, this country's place in relation to the
more civilized practices of most other countries on this small,
blue globe is hardly envious.
13. PRJEAN, supra note 6, at 100-01 (quoting GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, SAINT
JOAN 153-54 (1966)) (emphasis added).
14. Bohm, supra note 10, at 819.
15. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Poten-
tially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 73 (1987) (table listing executions where
authors believed defendants to be innocent - listing New York more than any
other state).
16. Bohm, supra note 10, at 825.
17. PREJEAN, supra note 6, at 219. Since 1976, when the Supreme Court rein-
stated capital punishment, 203 inmates have been executed. Compassion, Not Re-
venge, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, June 6, 1993, at 2B.
18. Wrongful Death, NEW YORKER, Aug. 16, 1993, at 4, 6.
19. PREJEAN, supra note 6, at 14.
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The realistic potentiality by which some innocent individu-
als are exposed to execution is exemplified by the "Career Girl
Murders" case in New York involving two young victims, Janice
Wylie and Emily Hoffert.20 On August 28, 1963, they were liter-
ally hacked to death in the upper East Side apartment they
shared as they started their careers.21 The tabloids of the day
howled, as these victims were from well-known families.
Months later, one George Whitmore was arrested in Brooklyn
for an unrelated attempted rape.22 One of the Brooklyn homi-
cide detectives noticed a photograph of a young, blonde woman
in Whitmore's wallet and mistakenly identified the woman as
one of the "Career Girl" victims. 23 Whitmore originally claimed
to have found the photograph in a dump in New Jersey. After a
lengthy interrogation, he confessed to the double murder in a
63-page statement.24 This confession turned out to be false and
was later cited in the great Miranda25 case as an example of
coerced and contrived confessions.26 Whitmore would have been
convicted at a time when New York still executed offenders.
However, a young Assistant District Attorney's dedication to his
higher ethical responsibility "to seek justice, not merely to con-
vict,"27 saved Whitmore, along with the dedication and persis-
tence of Whitmore's lawyer, Myron Beldock. Manhattan
Assistant District Attorney Melvin D. Glass doubted the valid-
ity of the Whitmore confession and doggedly helped to unravel
it, to the consternation of the New York Police Department and
many others who wanted and were pleased to have a perpetra-
tor - any perpetrator - for the horrendous crime that kept
catching so much media attention and public pressure.28 Even-
20. See John F. Keenan, The Urban Criminal Justice System: A Case For
Fairness, 20 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 579 (1993).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 580.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 581. Whitmore also confessed to the attempted rape for which he
had been arrested and to a separate homicide. Id.
25. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
26. Keenan, supra note 20, at 581 n.4.
27. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILrrY EC 7-13 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1994); see also People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 105, 464 N.E.2d 447,
451, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 83 (1984) (explaining that a prosecutor "is charged with the
duty not only to seek convictions but also to see that justice is done").
28. Keenan, supra note 20, at 581.
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tually, the real murderer, one Robles, was caught, convicted
and sentenced to 25 years to life. 29 (The death penalty by then
was essentially in a state of suspended federal constitutional
animation in New York.) His conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.30
The Robles affirmance highlights another irony. The Ro-
bles court held that the defendant's right to counsel was not vio-
lated, since the "assertion that once an attorney appears there
can be no effective waiver unless made 'in the presence of the
attorney' is merely a theoretical statement of the rule."3s Just six
years later, in People v. Hobson,32 the Court of Appeals over-
ruled its decision in Robles.33 In Hobson, which is an eloquent
dual treatise on New York's right to counsel and the meaning of
stare decisis, the court stated unequivocally that once an attor-
ney has entered the case, there can be no waiver of the right to
counsel in the absence of the attorney.34 The court also com-
mented that the nature of the crime in Robles, "an egregiously
brutal and unnatural double murder," was apparently "what
moved the [previous] court" to find as it did.35 Chief Judge Brei-
tel candidly added that the Robles case is "reminiscent of the
adage about the influence of 'hard cases'" making bad law.36
So, we see that the later clarification of the court admitted that
even the true culprit was not accorded all his constitutional pro-
tections. What a "two-fer" that case could have been in the ex-
poses of death penalty lore. We can only imagine the Sacco-
29. Id. at 583.
30. People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971). Although at the time of his arrest Robles con-
fessed to the double murder, he later recanted and protested his innocence. Kee-
nan, supra note 20, at 583. Twenty-three years later he publicly acknowledged his
guilt in an interview televised from his jail cell. Id.
31. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d at 158, 263 N.E.2d at 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d at 795 (empha-
sis added).
32. 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976). Hobson also
overruled People v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971) and People v. Wooden, 31 N.Y.2d 753, 290 N.E.2d 436,
338 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973). Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at
486, 348 N.E.2d at 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423. These cases were characterized as
'errant footprint[s]." Id. at 488, 348 N.E.2d at 901, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 425.
33. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 490, 348 N.E.2d at 902, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
34. Id. at 481, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
35. Id. at 486, 348 N.E.2d at 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
36. Id.
1994]
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Venzetti-like outcry if Whitmore and then Robles had been elec-
trocuted in light of what the world belatedly came to know.
While Governor Cuomo has thus far kept new death pen-
alty statutes off the New York books with his lonely vigil of
eleven straight vetoes,3 7 the state and its highest court, the
Court of Appeals, on which I have been privileged to serve for
over seven years, have not entirely avoided brushes with death
penalty cases. Consider the saga of Sammy Bice Johnson. In
1982, the State of Mississippi convicted Johnson in the fatal
shooting of a highway patrol officer on New Year's Eve, 1981.38
Johnson and three other men had been stopped by the officer for
speeding. A struggle ensued, during which the officer was
stabbed, shot and killed.39 Two of Johnson's cohorts, including
the shooter, received life sentences. 40 The third pled guilty to a
lesser charge in exchange for his testimony against the others.41
Only Johnson was sentenced to death after trial.42
One of the aggravating circumstances used to impose the
death penalty against him was a 1963 New York predicate-fel-
ony conviction for assault with intent to commit rape. 43 In
1986, represented by the New York law firm Cahill, Gordon &
Reindel, Johnson belatedly sought to have this New York predi-
37. Ian Fisher, Session on Guns Produces Little but Discord in Albany, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1994, at B4. Governor Cuomo's predecessor, Governor Hugh Ca-
rey, also vetoed several bills that would have reinstated the death penalty. Bohm,
supra note 10, at 822-25. Carey viewed capital punishment as "'the ultimate de-
ception.'" Id. at 824 (quoting Governor's Veto Memorandum, reprinted in 1978
N.Y. LEGIS. ANN. 426). Carey's reasons for exercising his veto power included the
lack of evidence of any deterrent effect, the possibility that an innocent person
would be executed, and his belief that the death penalty "lowers all of us as a
civilized people." Id. Carey supported life sentences without parole as has Gover-
nor Cuomo. Id. at 825; see also Mario Cuomo, Address at the College of St. Rose
(Mar. 20, 1989) in MAIO M. CuoMo, MORE THAN WORDS: THE SPEECHES OF MARIO
CuoMo 163 (1993).
38. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 580 (1988).
39. Id.; see also Rita Ciolli, Convict, and NY, vs. Mississippi, NEWSDAY, May
5, 1988, at 4, 41.
40. Ciolli, supra note 39, at 41.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also Rita Ciolli, New Death-Row Sentencing, NEWSDAY, June 14,
1988, at 5; Shirley Armstrong, May Save Miss. Inmate: High Court Overturns '63
Assault Verdict, TIMES UNION (Albany), March 25, 1987, at B-10.
43. Johnson v. State, 511 So. 2d 1333, 1336 (Miss. 1987), rev'd sub nom. John-
son v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988); see also E.J. McMahon, A Matter of 'Aggra-
vating Factors', NA'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 6.
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cate overturned on coram nobis collateral review in New York.44
He argued that he had not been advised in 1963 of his right to
appeal the New York felony and that his counsel rights had
been violated.45 By 1986, the records of his trial were no longer
available. In addition, the court reporter, prosecutor and trial
judge were all deceased. 46 Only the sentencing minutes were
available. They supported Johnson's claim that he had not been
advised of his right to appeal. 47 The Court of Appeals granted
coram nobis relief and held that the only remedy available was
vacatur of the 25-year-old conviction and dismissal of the
indictment.48
Buoyed by this victory, Johnson filed a petition for post-
conviction collateral relief in Mississippi. He argued that since
his New York conviction was a nullity, it could not serve as an
aggravating circumstance for sustaining the death penalty.49
By a six to three vote, the Supreme Court of Mississippi dis-
agreed. 50 It held that the "foreign" State of New York "cannot
vitiate the death penalty verdict in this state by setting aside a
prior conviction of a violent crime through a collateral relief pe-
tition."51 The court went so far as to opine that there was "no
evidence or indication that the post-conviction relief proceed-
ings in the New York courts were truly adversarial."52 I am
sure that surprised the New York District Attorney, who argued
so vigorously before the Court of Appeals. In dissent, Missis-
sippi Supreme Court Justice Robertson called his own court's
majority to task, stating:
[Tihe Court of Appeals of New York has enjoyed a reputation as
one of the nations [sic] premiere [sic] state courts. I am not for a
moment prepared to indulge in the cynical assumption that the
44. People v. Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d 339, 506 N.E.2d 1177, 514 N.Y.S.2d 324
(1987).
45. Id. at 341, 506 N.E.2d at 1178, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 325; Rita Ciolli, Where
Guilt Is a Side Issue, NEWSDAY, May 4, 1988, at 9, 17.
46. Armstrong, supra note 42, at B-10.
47. Id.
48. Johnson, 69 N.Y.2d at 342, 506 N.E.2d at 1178, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 325.
49. Johnson, 511 So. 2d at 1337.
50. Id. at 1339.
51. Id. at 1338.
52. Id.
1994]
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
New York Court did less than its duty when it ordered Johnson's
1963 conviction vacated.5 3
But Johnson, with Cahill, Gordon still at his side, fought
on. They appealed to the United States Supreme Court, with
then-New York Attorney General Robert Abrams supporting
the effort as an amicus curiae. The argument was that Missis-
sippi had failed to afford the New York judicial vacatur of that
state's conviction full faith and credit required by the United
States Constitution.54 New York had a stake and interest -
respect for the integrity of its judgment. The Mississippi offi-
cials became even more perturbed. The Mississippi Assistant
Attorney General, summed up his state's views by declaring:
"New York doesn't have the death penalty, so I guess they don't
understand how the law works."55 He opined that the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court "certainly got the message" that New York
was trying to block executions and labeled the $1.7 million in
legal fees expended by Cahill, Gordon "ludicrous."56
Ludicrous or not, Cahill, Gordon won a unanimous decision
of the United States Supreme Court - quite an achievement in
its own right - which held that Mississippi had violated John-
son's full faith and credit protection and the Eighth Amend-
ment.57 The Court gave the Mississippi Supreme Court a lesson
in "how the law works": its option was to order a new sentenc-
ing hearing or to decide on the appropriate sentence itself.58 In
53. Id. at 1344 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
54. The United States Constitution provides, in part: "Full Faith and Credit
shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of
every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also McMahon, supra note 43, at
6; Ciolli, supra note 39, at 4. Mr. Abrams also attended the oral arguments at the
Supreme Court, explaining that "he wanted to 'lend support' to the position that
Mississippi had 'misconstrued' New York's actions." Id. at 40. Mr. Abrams' ac-
tions were unprecedented. See id.; McMahon, supra note 43, at 6. Clive Stafford-
Smith of the Southern Prisoners Defense Committee, who has represented scores
of death row inmates, commented: "No attorney general has ever intervened to
help me out in another state .... I've had cases where a prior felony conviction
was unconstitutional, and the other state [in which the conviction occurred] has
refused to recognize it was unconstitutional." Id.
55. Ciolli, supra note 39, at 40 (quoting Marvin White, Jr., Mississippi Assis-
tant Attorney General).
56. Id.
57. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578 (1988).
58. Id. at 590.
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1989, the Mississippi Supreme Court remanded the case to the
County Court to empanel another sentencing jury.59
I had seen no public record of a new sentencing hearing or
of an execution. While a definitive answer on Johnson's status
is ascertainable in a variety of ways, I resolved that it was pru-
dent for me to remain judiciously aloof and to abide by the old
adage that no news was good news. Subsequent to my present-
ing the Dyson Lecture at Pace Law School, a former student of
mine, a partner in Cahill, Gordon, wrote me to confirm by pri-
vate letter that Johnson had been resentenced to life
imprisonment.
The case marvelously illustrates the central thrust of my
remarks and concern today - the disproportionality of resources
between the government and the defense in death penalty
cases, and the enormous, concomitant professional ethics con-
cerns that are thus implicated. Most death penalty offenders do
not receive anything near the persistent and enormous benefits
bestowed by Cahill, Gordon on Sammy Bice Johnson. And there
is the painful ethical rub! The prosecution has virtually no lim-
its. It operates with virtually unlimited resources with budgets
a little like that of the CIA - secret, hidden, fungible, protected
by "official" smoke and mirrors.
Recently, in response to a question as to why stays of execu-
tion are not sought from the Supreme Court until the eleventh
fateful hour, Justice Blackmun commented: "The death penalty
cases are a grisly business, in my opinion, and we get three or
four of them a week .... I've never understood why, but its
almost always in the middle of the night. It must be some tradi-
tion that we have about executions." 60 If, indeed, such a "tradi-
tion" exists, it is a tradition born of necessity and driven by
desperation along the multi-obstacled path of judicial review,
afforded by constitutional dictates, statutes, and tradition, but
grudgingly and meagerly funded every step of the way.
My first professional job out of law school was on a corpo-
rate law staff in New York City which, in the early sixties - if I
may recount the culture of the day with understatement - did
59. Johnson v. State, 547 So. 2d 59 (Miss. 1989), overruled by Clemons v.
State, 593 So. 2d 1004 (Miss. 1992).
60. Jeffrey Toobin, Field Trip, NEW YORKER, Oct. 18, 1993, at 128 (quoting
Justice Harry Blackmun).
1994]
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not encourage its young lawyers to provide pro bono service. I
turned to public work and law teaching and was able to take
some special assignments. One highlight was defending a con-
victed murderer on appeal. I visited him in Sing-Sing (Ossining
Correctional Facility, Ossining, New York) in 1971 as part of
my representation. Sing-Sing is still the "attic" where New
York's "Old Sparky"61 - a macabre nickname, to be sure - is
stored and held in reserve. That assigned counsel role re-
minded me that all lawyers face obligations rooted in the high-
est traditions of the noble and learned legal profession. The
duty is propounded in the Code of Professional Responsibility's
call to action.62
The visits to and the conferences at Sing-Sing, as well as
the planning and the professional exhilaration of briefing, argu-
ing, and even winning on appeal, 63 were counterbalanced some-
what and put in professional perspective by my wife and young
61. "Old Sparky" is the name given to Florida's 69-year-old electric chair.
Barry Bearak, Dispute Over Fiery Death Idles Florida Electric Chair, L.A. TIMES,
July 23, 1990, at A15. Since 1924, over 218 inmates have died in the three-legged
oak chair, which was built by inmates. Ellen McGarrahan, Old Sparky Focus of
Death Appeals, MiAmi HERALD, June 24, 1990, at 6B.
62. "A lawyer should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make
legal counsel available." N.Y. JuD. LAW app., CODE OF PRoFEssioNAL REsPONSIBIL-
rry Canon 2 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994). As stated in an ethical consideration
of New York's Code of Professional Responsibility:
Historically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay reasonable
fees has been met in part by lawyers who donated their services or accepted
court appointments on behalf of such individuals. The basic responsibility
for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the
individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the disad-
vantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a law-
yer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional
workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The
rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees contin-
ues to be an obligation of each lawyer, but the efforts of individual lawyers
are often not enough to meet the need. Thus it has been necessary for the
profession to institute additional programs to provide legal services. Ac-
cordingly, legal aid offices, lawyer referral services, and other related pro-
grams have been developed, and others will be developed, by the profession.
Every lawyer should support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal
services.
N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILITY EC 2-25 (McKinney
1992).
63. People v. Cathey, 38 A.D.2d 976, 976, 331 N.Y.S.2d 837, 838 (2d Dep't
1972).
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children's conversational skepticism as to why I was working so
hard - as they saw it at the time - to set a murderer free. The
anxieties and inner challenge that those musings evoked, in
sharp contrast to the pro bono lawyer's - any lawyer's - pro-
fessional duty, still stir philosophical questions. Every time I
read about or rule on a similar case (the killing of a taxi driver),
I utter a small, private mantra that my erstwhile client is not
involved. I even fantasize that he is out there somewhere as a
reformed, contributing member of society.
The "why" for lawyers and law students performing similar
service is found in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which imposes upon all attorneys the obligation to "assist the
legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel avail-
able"." Indeed, it is a "basic tenet of the professional responsi-
bility of lawyers... that every person in our society should have
ready access to the independent professional services of a law-
yer of integrity and competence." 65
The principle that a lack of funds should not deprive an in-
dividual of the right to effective counsel and related representa-
tional services should not be hollow rhetoric. The Code
instructs attorneys that "[t]hose persons unable to pay for legal
services should be provided needed services." 66 Despite the fact
that indigent defendants are entitled to court-appointed attor-
neys, there are currently at least 100 death row inmates in Ala-
bama, California and Texas, some with execution dates, who
are not represented by an attorney. 67 In short, there is a death
row counsel crisis in this country.
Since 1982, the number of death row inmates has increased
by 142%. 68 At the same time, the pool of attorneys willing and
able to take capital cases is shrinking, in part because of lean
economic times, lack of compensation, and seemingly impatient
Supreme Court attitudes and rulings. 69 The view seems to be
64. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (Mc-
Kinney 1992 & Supp. 1994).
65. Id. EC 1-1.
66. Id. EC 8-3.
67. Marcia Coyle, As Executions Speed Up Death Counsel Shortage Grows,
NATL L.J., Sept. 27, 1993, at 3.
68. Marcia Coyle et al., Death Penalty Centers Come Under Pressure, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 11, 1993, at 5.
69. Coyle, supra note 67, at 3.
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that popular opinion, measured by prolific polls, shows that
Americans favor executions in capital cases. The attitude
seems to be let's just get on with them and get them over with!
Fortunately, that is not this country's proud constitutional tra-
dition. Our time-tested system tries to ensure, or at least pro-
claims that it is designed to ensure, the protection of everyone's
rights, especially the most needy and most vulnerable, includ-
ing the guilty.
Recruitment focuses on large firms in major cities, since
they have the resources and some expertise in handling long,
complicated processes. 70 However, law firms have been down-
sizing, restructuring, right-sizing and retrenching. Since virtu-
ally all death row inmates are indigent, they are generally de-
pendent upon court-appointed attorneys whose resources are
limited by statutory fees, unless a large firm is willing to take
the case and absorb the costs. In New York, the fee for assigned
counsel in a capital case is limited to $2,800, unless two or more
attorneys are appointed, in which cases the fee is increased to
$3,200. 71 In Mississippi (which ranks forty-ninth in per capita
spending for indigent defense) 72 and in Louisiana, the maxi-
mum fee is $1,000; and in Georgia, it is $50 to $150 at trial and
no more than $500 for preparation and investigation for trial
and appeal expenses.7 3 Alabama pays defense attorneys $20
per hour, up to a maximum of $2,000 for out-of-court prepara-
tion.74 Many states do not compensate attorneys at all for post-
conviction proceedings. 75
These statistics reinforce the adage that "capital punish-
ment is for them who have no capital." Sammy Bice Johnson is
alive today because of the tenacity, endurance and resources
committed by Cahill, Gordon. As of early December 1989, when
70. Id. Many major law firms have taken at least one capital case; however,
firms are reluctant to take on more than one case at a time because death penalty
cases are time-consuming, complex and costly. Id. at 46.
71. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35(3) (McKinney 1992).
72. Frank Judge, Death Row Defense, Wall Street Style, Am. LAw., Jan.-Feb.
1989, at 35, 36.
73. PREJEAN, supra note 6, at 252 n.18.
74. Id.
75. Coyle, supra note 67, at 46. In San Francisco, the cost of having a private
criminal defense attorney, in situations where the public defender's office was un-
able to represent the indigent defendant, doubled from 1990 to 1991. Speaking for
the Defense, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 24, 1991, at B6.
[Vol. 14:1
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/1
1994] ETHICAL IMPULSES
the Supreme Court ruled in Johnson's favor, twenty-nine Ca-
hill, Gordon attorneys and twenty-seven summer associates had
worked on the case for two years. 76 They spent a total of 7,886
hours on the case and billings and expenses exceeded $1.7 mil-
lion.7 7 Even with all of their available resources, the attorneys
who worked on the case felt that they were "stretched."78 They
worked twenty-hour days to prepare the appeal and stay appli-
cations. 79 Johnson found Cahill, Gordon purely by chance after
spending three and one-half years on death row. A young asso-
ciate in the firm was induced into approaching the partners at
the firm by a friend working with the Southern Prisoner's De-
fense Committee in Atlanta.80 When Cahill, Gordon agreed to
take on the case, none of its 285 attorneys had any expertise in
death penalty cases.8'
Although the Mississippi Assistant Attorney General found
the amount of money expended by Cahill, Gordon "ludicrous,"8 2
it is not uncommon for a death penalty appeal to cost over $1
million. Phoenix lawyer; James Belanger, estimated that he
spent between $2.5 and $4 million in lawyer hours, court ex-
penses and other expenses when he represented Don Eugene
Harding, who died in the gas chamber in April 1992, twelve
76. Judge, supra note 72, at 35. When Cahill, Gordon was approached by one
of their associates about taking the case, they believed that they could handle it
with a handful of summer associates. Id. at 37.
77. Id. at 42.
78. Id. at 39.
79. Id. at 38. A month after Cahill, Gordon agreed to represent Johnson, the
Mississippi Supreme Court set an execution date only three weeks away. Id. at 37.
When their motion for a stay was denied, Cahill, Gordon had two weeks to estab-
lish a good faith and meritorious basis for post-conviction relief. Although most of
the attorneys had experienced high pressure and high stakes litigation, the sum-
mer associates were neophytes, many of whom had never worked in a law office
before. There was "no time for hand-holding or mistakes.' Id.
80. Id. Anthony Paduano was a 28-year-old, second-year litigation associate
at Cahill, Gordon when he was approached by Clive Stafford-Smith of the South-
ern Prisoners Defense Committee. Stafford-Smith, who joined the Defense Com-
mittee in 1984 and routinely handles about 40 death penalty cases, exerted
constant pressure on Paduano, including calling him at 4 a.m., until Paduano
agreed to approach the partners at Cahill, Gordon about taking the case. Id.
81. Id. Laurence Sorkin, an antitrust partner who oversees pro bono cases,
recalled that before Cahill, Gordon accepted Johnson's case, he (Sorkin) did not
know that inmates do not have a right to counsel on post-conviction appeals. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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years after committing a double murder.83 John Henry Knapp's
attorneys spent over $2 million in lawyer hours and $100,000 in
out-of-pocket costs. s4 Knapp was freed in November 1992 after
spending twelve years on Arizona's death row.8 5 He pled guilty
to two counts of second degree murder in exchange for time
served. 86 The Phoenix firm of Snell and Wilmer provided
$620,838 in legal services over the four years it represented
Roger Lynn Smith, who received a life sentence in 1992.87 The
firm was reimbursed $102,132 by the state.8 No one diligently
totes up the prosecution costs to provide some perspective.
83. Pamela Manson, Matter of Life or Death: Capital Punishment Costly, Aiz.
REPUBLIC, Aug. 23, 1993, at Al, A2. In 1980, Harding killed two men in Tucson
and one in Phoenix. Id. at A2. He was the first inmate to be executed in Arizona
since 1963. Id.
84. Id. John Henry Knapp was convicted in the arson deaths of his two young
daughters in 1973. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. He continues to insist that he is innocent. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. These cases illustrate the fallacy of the economic argument often ad-
vanced in support of the death penalty. Research on several states indicates that
it is more expensive to execute a prisoner than to feed, clothe and house him/her
for life. Id. at Al. In Florida, for example, an estimated $3.2 million is spent per
death penalty case; "[in Texas, the figure is $2.3 million." Id. Sources estimate
that in Arizona, the cost tops $1 million per case. The high cost is attributable, in
part, to the extended appeal process; a death penalty case, from trial through the
final appeal stage, often takes up to 12 years. Id. at A1-A2. Paul McMurdie, the
34 year-old head of the criminal-appeals division of the Arizona Attorney-General's
Office, handled a habeas case where the crime took place before his birth. Id. at
A2. The defendant received a life sentence.
However, the trial stage also absorbs a large portion of the expense. In a capi-
tal case in Arizona, for example, the prosecutor must decide whether to seek the
death penalty within 10 days of arraignment. Investigations on both sides are
more extensive; as Roland Steinle, a public defender in Arizona, noted an investi-
gator is hired as soon as the defense attorney knows it is a death penalty case. The
investigator searches all available records and investigates the family history for
the last three generations in an effort to locate mitigating factors. A psychologist
is generally hired at a cost of $1,500 to $2,000; in comparison, psychological tests
for a defendant facing a life sentence generally run closer to $350. Juries take
longer to select, more expert witnesses are called and, if there is a conviction, a
separate sentencing hearing must be held. These hearings are equivalent to a
second trial, and often take three or four days. Once the defendant is sentenced to
death, the appeals process begins. It has been estimated "that a properly con-
ducted death penalty appeal taken through the entire system costs a minimum of
$100,000"; it is stressed that that figure is "rock bottom." Id. (emphasis added).
Another factor in the high cost of death penalty cases is the nationwide rever-
sal rate of 40%; these cases require a second sentencing hearing. If the conviction
is overturned, a new trial must be held, with the possibility of another round of
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The New York State Bar Association actively encourages
attorneys to take on pro bono cases, as do most State Bar As-
sociations, the American Bar Association, and the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York. New York's Court of Appeals,
and a growing cadre of important entities also officially sanction
pro bono involvement.8 9 Ironically, in some southern states, the
local Bars are relatively inactive in recruiting attorneys for cap-
ital cases.90 Alabama, for example, has a desperate need for at-
torneys; yet, the State Bar "never has been a factor in providing
death row counsel .... " 91 Currently, the shortage of attorneys
and financial burden falls on death penalty resource centers,
which recruit and assist attorneys representing indigent death
row inmates. There are twenty of these nonprofit, legal services
organizations across the country. 92 However, their continued
effectiveness and existence is uncertain because of a threatened
reduction of federal funding. The House of Representatives has
approved about $19 million for the next fiscal year; this would
keep the centers running at their current level.93 However, the
Senate has approved only $11.5 million, which would mean that
the centers could handle no new cases in 1994.94 Representa-
tive John Field of Texas has even introduced a Bill to eliminate
all funding.95 This is curious in the extreme, since Texas has
the largest death row population in the nation and the greatest
need for attorneys.96 The abolition of these centers would result
appeals. Since most death row defendants are indigent at the commencement of
their trials, and virtually all are indigent by the time their case reaches the appeal
stage, the cost is borne by taxpayers. Id.
89. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1994) ("A lawyer has an obligation to render public interest and pro
bono legal service."); see also Joseph W. Bellacosa, Obligatory Pro Bono Publico
Legal Services: Mandatory or Voluntary? Distinction Without a Difference?, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 745 (1991).
90. Coyle, supra note 67, at 46.
91. Id. at 46.
92. Coyle, supra note 68, at 5. These centers were created by Congress to
recruit and aid lawyers representing death row inmates. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 5, 12. In 1991, there were 2,412 death row inmates in the United
States. Bohm, supra note 10, at 820 n.4. The fact that 332 of them were in Texas,
id., is not surprising, since two-thirds of all executions are carried out in Louisi-
ana, Georgia, Texas and Florida. PRxjsm, supra note 6, at 49. This explains why
the southern states are referred to as the "Death Belt." Id.
1994]
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in a skyrocketing of costs, since noncenter attorneys would have
to assume responsibility for these cases.97
In addition to the lack of funds, it is also usual for court-
appointed attorneys to lack experience with capital cases and,
often, with any criminal cases. The American Bar Association
has cited incompetent trial defense counsel as the reason that
so many cases in which federal habeas relief is sought are re-
versed.98 Louisiana requires that an attorney appointed to rep-
resent a defendant accused of capital murder have five years
experience practicing law.99 However, that experience can be in
any field of law.100 Some states have no minimum experience
requirement. The attorneys appointed to defend Johnson at
trial in Mississippi were two recent law school graduates with
no experience in capital cases. 1 1 The case nearly drove them
into insolvency, and their inexperience literally nearly killed
Johnson. 102
97. Coyle, supra note 68, at 12. Panel attorneys are paid $75 to $125 per hour
under the Criminal Justice Act. Id. Without the services of the Resource Centers,
"lawyers would have to spend a lot more billable time on these cases or they won't
be representing inmates adequately," according to Nick Trenticosta of the Louisi-
ana Center. Id.
98. Speaking for the Defense, supra note 75, at B6.
99. PREjEAN, supra note 6, at 49.
100. Id. In Louisiana, it is not uncommon for judges to appoint attorneys who
have never practiced criminal law. Id.
101. Judge, supra note 72, at 36.
102. Id. The state paid them the $1000 maximum and refused requests for
additional money. Requests that the state pay for forensic experts and investiga-
tive assistants for the guilt phase of the trial were denied, along with requests for
funding to bring out-of-state witnesses to Mississippi for the sentencing hearing.
Consequently, there were no witnesses to plead for Johnson's life at his trial. One
of his lawyers told the jury that Johnson was poor, and that if he could afford it,
his family would have been present and would have "begged for his life." Id. After
only two days of trial, the jury sentenced him to death.
At his trial, Johnson's attorneys objected to the admission of his 1963 New
York conviction on the grounds that it was too remote to support the death pen-
alty, but they had neither the time nor the resources to investigate further. Id. at
37. In contrast, Cahill, Gordon, with its resources, quickly discovered that the
crime for which Johnson was convicted in New York, second degree assault with
intent to commit first degree rape, no longer existed under New York law. How-
ever, even with their resources, Cahill, Gordon's summer associates scrambled in
the days before Johnson's execution date "to find anyone who might have knowl-
edge or records of the case," accomplishing what was impossible for Johnson's trial
attorneys because of their lack of experience, staff and financial resources. Id. at
37-38.
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In 1990, the National Law Journal conducted a six-month
investigation into the quality of representation afforded capital
defendants in the South.10 3 The results were appalling. More
than half of the attorneys interviewed said they were handling
their first capital murder case when their client was con-
victed.'0 4 Even more disturbing, the Journal found that in the
six states they studied, attorneys representing indigent death
row inmates were disbarred, disciplined or suspended at rates
ranging from three to forty-six times the overall rates for those
states. 0 5 About twenty-five percent of the inmates on death
row in Kentucky were represented by attorneys who were sub-
sequently disbarred, suspended or convicted of crimes
themselves. 06
President Clinton's comprehensive anti-crime bill would re-
quire states to appoint attorneys with experience in investiga-
tion and defense of capital cases. 0 7 That is some good news in
this subject area. A quid pro quo, however, is a drastic reduc-
tion in available appeals between conviction and execution. The
bill would impose a 180-day time limit for filing an appeal to the
federal courts after conviction of a capital crime.'08 After the
180 days has elapsed, there would be no right to an appeal un-
less new evidence surfaced, 10 9 and the Supreme Court's opinion
in Herrera v. Collins"0 teaches how restrictive that would be
103. Marcia Coyle et al., Fatal Defense, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1980, at 30.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Anthony Lewis, A Muted Trumpet, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 16, 1991, at A23.
107. See David Lauter, Clinton's Plan To Fight Crime, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12,
1993, at Al.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). Leonel Torres Herrera was convicted in 1982 of
murdering two Texas police officers and was sentenced to death. Id. at 856. The
proof at trial included two eyewitnesses, abundant circumstantial evidence, and a
letter written by Herrera in which he impliedly admitted his guilt. Id. at 857. In
1992, Herrera sought federal habeas relief on the grounds that newly discovered
evidence demonstrated that he was innocent. Id. at 856. In support of this claim,
he submitted affidavits tending to prove that the murders were committed by his
late brother. Id. at 857. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence,
rejecting his argument that he was entitled to habeas relief in light of the newly
discovered evidence. Id. at 870, Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated:
Once a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense
for which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears ....
1994]
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anyway. The bill also adds fifty new crimes which qualify for
death penalty punishment.11' That is a lot of bad news.
Add to this potent medicine the fact that prosecutors have
carte blanche resources, virtually unlimited access to experts,
investigatory-prosecutorial alliances, forensics, science - you
name it. As if that does not load the dice enough in favor of the
prosecution, our system also virtually insures that the defense
ledger in all these services categories be drenched in red ink
and debts - they have and are given comparatively nothing! A
graph would display the distorted equation as a parabola, with
the prosecution at apogee and the defense at perigee.
Disparity of resources is only one of the ethical conun-
drums attorneys representing death row inmates find them-
selves in; other dilemmas include whether, and when, to accept
a plea bargain and whether to oppose the imposition of the
death penalty at all in a particular case. In 1982, Jarvious
Cotton was arrested and indicted in Mississippi for the mur-
der of Robert Irby.1" 2 After escaping from his Mississippi jail
Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never
been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent
constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state criminal proceed-
ing.... This rule is grounded in the principle that federal habeas courts sit
to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the Constitu-
tion - not to correct errors of fact.
Id. at 860. Herrera was executed by lethal injection on May 12, 1993. Nat Hentoff,
Death and Reasonable Doubt in Texas, WASH. PosT, May 29, 1993, at A31.
Innocence has been labeled "The Achilles' heel of the death penalty...." Mar-
cia Coyle, Innocence vs. Executions, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 27, 1993, at 1, 33. Since 1933,
48 inmates have been released from death row "because of evidence of their inno-
cence or serious doubt as to their guilt." Id. at 33.
111. Helen Dewar, Senate Passes Crime Package, Shelves Brady Bill, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 20, 1993, at Al, A5; see also Schroth, supra note 6, at 20. Under the
crime bill, the death penalty could be imposed for the murder of law enforcement
officials, drive-by shootings, deaths incident to a caijacking and for large-scale
drug trafficking, even if no killing is involved. Dewar, supra, at A5. The crime bill,
known as the Biden Bill, also contains an amendment which would authorize fed-
eral prosecutors to seek the death penalty in cases involving gun-related homi-
cides. Daniel Wise, U.S. Judges Are Wary of Fallout From Crime Bill, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 7, 1993, at 1, 7. As a result, murderers in states which have no death penalty,
such as New York, could still face the death penalty if state prosecutors agreed to
have the case tried in federal court. Id.
112. David Holmberg, A Question of Venue, NEWSDAY, July 1, 1987, at 4. On
March 12, 1982, while tourists were flocking to Natchez, Mississippi's antebellum
homes and a pageant celebrating the city's colorful history was being presented,
Robert Irby, the 17-year-old son of a prominent, white banker, and three of his
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/1
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cell, 113 Cotton spent five years living in New York under the
name Contee Fuller.11 4 He was apprehended when his finger-
prints, taken during a prior arrest for marijuana use in a New
York subway, showed that he was wanted as a fugitive."15
Although New York honored Mississippi's request to extra-
dite him,1 6 Cotton never went to trial. In a surprise turn of
friends, were approached outside the city's auditorium by three black men. One of
the assailants brandished a gun and demanded money. After Irby and his friends
handed over $21, the assailant fired the gun into the air and fled. Irby chased the
assailants for about a block, until one of them turned and shot him twice, once in
the leg and once in the head. Cotton and three other men were arrested within
days of the shooting. Charges were dropped against two of the men, and the third,
Terry Johnson, is serving a life sentence after pleading guilty. Cotton maintained
that he was not present at the time of the shooting. Id.
113. After spending five months in an Adams County jail, Cotton escaped by
crawling through an air conditioning duct. According to police, Cotton broke
through the wall of his cell with a hacksaw blade, then escaped through the duct in
the adjoining cell. Cotton's mother was charged as an accessory following his es-
cape and served six months in the county jail. While she was not charged with
aiding Cotton in the actual escape, police alleged that she smuggled money and
clothes to Cotton after his escape. A friend of Cotton's was convicted of smuggling
in the hacksaw used in his escape. Id.
114. Id. Cotton chose this alias "because his middle name is Contee and his
mother's maiden name is Fuller." Id. By using that name, Cotton explained: "I
felt like I wasn't really lying .... I don't like to lie." Id. In New York, Cotton lived
what the media described as a "nearly exemplary" life, working his way up from
bag boy to assistant manager at a supermarket in Greenwich Village, where he
supervised 25 people. Id.
115. Miss. Extradition Argued in Court, NEWSDAY, July 23, 1987, at 22. Cot-
ton was arrested in November of 1986 at the Marcy Avenue subway station in
Brooklyn. Based on the fingerprint check, he was rearrested in March of 1987. Id.
116. Id. In May of 1987, Governor Cuomo signed the extradition order after
receiving oral assurances that a "highly competent" attorney would be appointed
to represent Cotton; that the Mississippi District Attorney would not oppose a
change of venue motion; and that Cotton and his family would receive any neces-
sary protection. People ex rel. Neufeld v. Commissioner, 71 N.Y.2d 881, 883-84,
522 N.E.2d 1060, 1060-61, 527 N.Y.S.2d 762, 762-63 (1988) (Bellacosa, J., concur-
ring); Holmberg, supra note 112, at 5; Cuomo OKs Extradition to Mississippi in
Capital Case, KNICKERBOCKER NEWS (Albany), May 29, 1987, at 5A [hereinafter
Cuomo OKs Extradition]. Cotton appealed his extradition on the grounds that the
Governor had not held a hearing. People ex rel. Neufeld v. Commissioner, 132
A.D.2d 720, 721, 518 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199 (2d Dep't 1987). The Court of Appeals
upheld the extradition, relying on the appellate division's opinion. Neufeld, 71
N.Y.2d at 883, 522 N.E.2d at 1060, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 762. The Second Department
had relied in part upon the assurances received by the Governor, in holding that
no hearing was necessary to protect Cotton's constitutional rights. Neufeld, 132
A.D.2d at 721, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
Although I concurred in the result, I harbored some doubts, based in part on
the Sammy Bice Johnson experience, as to the reliability of the assurances given to
21
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events, he accepted a plea bargain in return for a life sen-
tence. 117 He will be eligible for parole in 1998.118 His attorney
expects him to be freed then. 1 9 She also viewed the plea bar-
gain as a victory.1 20
Whether to counsel a criminal defendant to accept a plea
bargain is itself a difficult decision fraught with ethical pitfalls.
But Cotton's Mississippi attorney, Allison Steiner, believes that
"lawyers should fight very hard to obtain plea bargains in death
penalty cases, and to persuade clients to accept them... .1 21 In
the Governor. Neufeld, 71 N.Y.2d at 886-87, 522 N.E.2d at 1062, 527 N.Y.S.2d at
764-65 (Bellacosa, J., concurring). The day after the extradition order was signed,
the Mississippi authorities appeared to retreat significantly from these assur-
ances, stating, "We cannot give any assurances." Id. at 886, 522 N.E.2d at 1062,
527 N.Y.S.2d at 764. I was also troubled by the fact that Cotton's mother was
prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of murder for allegedly aiding in Cotton's
escape. Id. As I said at the time, "These developments represent[ed] to me an
apparently guileful affront by Mississippi officials to our State's highest executive
official and to the interests of this State in protecting the rights of persons entitled
to the benefits of the New York and United States Constitutions." Id.
Cotton's New York attorney, Russell Neufeld, was concerned that he would
not receive a fair trial in Natchez. David Holmberg, Mississippi Man Will Stand
Trial For 1982 Slaying, NEWSDAY, Apr. 1, 1988, at 9; Cuomo OKs Extradition,
supra, at 5A_ Cotton alleged that he had been beaten and tormented by the guards
at the Adams County jail prior to his escape. Neufeld, 132 A.D.2d at 721, 518
N.Y.S.2d at 199. George West, Cotton's former attorney, told reporters at News-
day that while Cotton was in jail, guards "waved burnt toast in front of him and
said he would be as crisp as that." Cuorno OKs Extradition, supra, at 5A. West
resigned from the case after receiving death threats. Holmberg, supra note 112, at
5. Mississippi Circuit Court Judge Edwin Benoist, while expressing concern about
appointing an out-of-county attorney, stressed that Cotton would receive a fair
trial. Holmberg, Mississippi Man Will Stand Trial for 1982 Slaying, supra, at 27.
He indicated that he did not understand why there was any concern, stating, "I
realize that people in New York think Mississippi is like South Africa, but people
in Mississippi are pretty good people. I'd rather be tried in Natchez than in New
York." Id.
117. David Holmberg, A Question of Survival, NEWSDAY, Sept. 12, 1988, at 3.
Cotton pleaded guilty to felony murder a few weeks before his scheduled trial. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. His Mississippi attorney, Allison Steiner, noted that "[tihe practice
[in Mississippi] has been to parole capital murders at or about first eligibility...."
Id. (alteration in original).
120. Id.
121. Id. Steiner notes that she has never seen a death penalty case where she
would recommend against a plea bargain. Steiner's three-person firm had han-
dled seven death penalty cases as of 1988, six of which were court-appointed cases.
She has never lost a client to the electric chair. Of the seven cases, a plea bargain
was obtained in five and two were convicted and sentenced to life. Although
Steiner has not made death penalty cases her life work, she believes that "any
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/1
1994] ETHICAL IMPULSES
fact, Steiner regards it as "improper" to reject a plea bargain in
a capital case. 122 She bases this belief in part on statistics gar-
nered by the Southern Prisoners Defense Committee in Atlanta.
According to the Committee, sixty percent of the death row in-
mates in Georgia turned down plea bargains. 123 Nationwide,
the figure is about fifty percent. 24
Clive Stafford-Smith, a staff attorney for the Southern Pris-
oners Defense Committee, points out that persuading a client to
accept a plea bargain rather than to gamble on receiving the
death sentence, does not amount to neglecting the duty to
mount a strong defense. 25 Neither is it an admission, or as-
sumption, that the client is guilty. 26 Rather, it is a realistic
and pragmatic approach. He notes that "U]urors are death
qualified . . .and conviction-prone." 27 As Cotton's New York
attorney, Russell Neufeld, noted, "To take a chance on the elec-
tric chair is nuts."128 It is imperative, however, that the ulti-
mate decision be the defendant's. As stated in the Ethical
Considerations to Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility: "A defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to ad-
lawyer with the competence to do criminal law has an ethical obligation to take
indigent cases, and therefore some capital murder cases." Id. Steiner noted that
District Attorneys are also more "reluctant to plunge into a capital case .... It's
more work, . . . they are subjected to more scrutiny politically[,]... and it's not an
efficient use of their time." Id. She added, "I think they'll only do it if they feel
every certainty that they'll win." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Although Steiner wonders "if any of us is perfect enough to take a
life," she notes that juries in capital cases do not share her hesitancy. Juries in
capital cases are comprised of people who have already indicated to one degree or
another that they are not squeamish about imposing the death sentence. Stafford-
Smith also noted that in many death penalty cases there is a particularly strong
case against the defendant. In Cotton's case, Steiner had to contend with the fact
that he had escaped. While there was strong evidence implicating him in the
shooting, there was also equally strong evidence exonerating him. There were no
eyewitnesses to support the claim that Cotton was involved; however, another de-
fendant in the case had testified that Cotton had been a participant. In addition, a
cellmate of Cotton's, who had escaped with him, told police where to find the gun
allegedly used in the shooting. He claimed to have acquired this information from
Cotton, but the police were never able to conclusively link the weapon to the shoot-
ing. Id.
128. Id.
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vise the client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge
appears to be desirable... but it is for the client to decide what
plea should be [accepted]." 129
Take this a step further - to the cause of the client who has
been convicted and wants to die. What is an attorney's ethical
duty in the situation where death can be postponed, but the cli-
ent prefers immediate death to a lengthy prison term? This was
the ethical dilemma that Johnie O'Neal, a strong opponent of
the death penalty, had to confront when he agreed to represent
Thomas Grasso in Oklahoma.
Grasso was convicted of second degree murder in 1992 for
strangling an elderly man in Staten Island. 130 He was sen-
tenced to twenty years to life, without possibility of parole until
the year 2011.131 He was then returned to Oklahoma in accord-
ance with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 132 to stand
trial for a murder committed in Tulsa on Christmas Day 1990
under the same modus operandi.133 Upon his return, Grasso
pled guilty to the Tulsa murder and requested the death pen-
alty. 34 He decided he would rather die than grow old in
prison.1'5
129. N.Y. JUD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-7 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1994).
130. Sarah Lyall, New York Battles Oklahoma Over Custody of a Murderer,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1993, at Al, B10.
131. Id.
132. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1989).
133. Matt Siegel, Defending a Death Wish, AM. LAw., Apr. 1993, at 60, 61;
Lyall, supra note 130, at Al; see Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802 (Okla. Crim. App.
1993). Under the agreement, New York was required to return Grasso to
Oklahoma temporarily to stand trial. Oklahoma was then required to return him
to New York to serve his sentence, after which he would be sent back to Oklahoma
to serve whatever sentence had been imposed there. Lyall, supra note 130, at B10.
Grasso's case is not the first time that a convicted murderer has been returned to
New York to serve a sentence imposed there. In 1990, William Branshaw, who
was accused of murder in New York and Florida, was returned to New York to
serve a 25-year-to-life sentence. Id.
134. Lyall, supra note 130, at B10.
135. Siegel, supra note 133, at 60. Grasso is not the first convicted murderer
to choose death. Of the first 100 executions carried out after 1976, 11 were consen-
sual. Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency, 43 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 1, 45 n.195 (1992) (citing Michael L. Radelet & George W. Bernard,
Ethics and the Psychiatric Determination of Competency to be Executed, 14 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 37, 49 (1986)). In 1977, Gary Gilmore instructed his
attorneys to forego any appeals and was executed by a firing squad on January 17,
1977. Mossman, supra, at 45 n.194.
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When Oklahoma refused to return Grasso to New York,
New York took the matter to federal court.136 Twelve hours
before Grasso was scheduled to die, Oklahoma Federal District
Court Judge Frank Seay ordered him returned to New York.137
The issue is settled at least to the extent that Oklahoma reluc-
tantly returned Grasso to New York, where he is now incarcer-
ated in Attica State Prison. The appeals and publicity have
somewhat abated for now, though Grasso has generated televi-
sion interviews and potential magazine and book exertions.
While the dispute over Grasso's fate is interesting, the un-
derlying ethical issue should focus on what an attorney in
Johnie O'Neal's position should do. Very little precedent exists
to guide an attorney in unearthing the legal and ethical obliga-
tions to the client. The Code of Professional Responsibility re-
quires attorneys to represent their clients "zealously within the
bounds of the law."138 However, the Ethical Considerations in-
struct that except "[i]n certain areas of legal representation not
affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the
rights of a client ... the authority to make decisions is exclu-
sively that of the client and, if made within the framework of
the law, such decisions are binding on the lawyer." 39
O'Neal decided not to contest the death penalty in Grasso's
case. He based this decision, in part, on certain assumptions.
Among them, that he had never seen a capital defendant in
Oklahoma get less than life without parole and that the Judge
would not allow Grasso to serve his Oklahoma sentence concur-
rently with his New York sentence. 40 He also heeded his per-
136. New York ex rel. Coughlin v. Poe, 835 F. Supp. 585, 587 (E.D. Okla.
1993). Although Grasso agreed not to be returned, New York maintained that it
was not his decision, Siegel, supra note 133, at 63, and that the agreement did not
give Oklahoma any discretionary authority to retain custody of Grasso. Lyall,
supra note 130, at B10.
137. Doug Ferguson, Federal Judge Rules Killer Must Serve New York Sen-
tence, TIMES UNION (Albany), Oct. 19, 1993, at A-1.
138. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7
(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994).
139. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1994).
140. Siegel, supra note 133, at 62.
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sonal conviction that people should be allowed to choose death
over life in prison without possibility of parole. 141
O'Neal's critics argue that no one can assess the future
quality of another person's life.142 Even more troubling is the
issue of whether or not such determinations are the proper
function of an attorney. O'Neal counters this argument by
pointing out that he often makes these types of decisions. 143 Af-
ter all, all attorneys pick and choose among available argu-
ments - discarding the weaker ones in a kind of Darwinian
exercise. 44 For a criminal defendant in a capital case a miscal-
culation by the attorney could not be more critical or
meaningful.
What of an attorney's ethical duty to allow the client to de-
termine the ultimate goal of his legal representation?145
Grasso's reasons for seeking the death penalty are far from
legal. As he put it, "I'd rather deal with the possibility of hell on
the other side, than deal with living hell right here in prison."146
141. Id. at 61. O'Neal contends that "Grasso could [not] lead a useful and
happy life in prison, [and asserts that] he probably could not advocate death for
any client who stood a chance of making something of his life." Id. at 63. O'Neal
also relied upon his personal belief that "his principle [sic] duty was to stand up for
a lone client fighting against a powerful system." Id. at 61. He describes his advo-
cacy in the Grasso case as "sort of the ultimate act against the government." Id. at
63.
142. Id. at 62, 63.
143. Id. at 62.
144. Id. at 62. O'Neal notes that every time he files a brief on appeal, he
excludes weaker arguments for tactical reasons. Id. Thus, he argues, he "often
makes life-or-death decisions about how a judge might reasonably be expected to
rule .... " Id.
145. N.Y. JuD. LAW app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLrrY EC 7-7, 7-8
(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994). Professor Linda Carter, of McGeorge School of
Law in Sacramento, contends that failing to advocate for a client's execution where
that is what the client wants would amount to a violation of the American Bar
Association's ethical rules that the client must determine the goals of his legal
representation. Siegel, supra note 133, at 62. She notes, however, that complying
with the ABA guidelines in these circumstances may result in the facilitation of a
violation of the defendant's Eighth Amendment rights. Id.
146. Charles M. Sennott, Grasso Puts Low Value on His Life, DAILY NEWS
(New York), Oct. 14, 1993, at 7, 40. Grasso has stated that he would rather be
executed because there is some decency in dying like that. Id. at 7.
Knowing that death row inmates often give up hope, O'Neal and his staff vig-
orously tested Grasso's conviction to die. Siegel, supra note 133, at 62. In addition
to having him examined by a clinical psychologist to determine his competency,
O'Neal's Deputy Public Defender visited with Grasso and explained in graphic de-
tail how he would die; she also "grilled him about how he wanted his body disposed
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/1
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However, his reasons seem irrelevant. "In the final analysis...
the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether
to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-
legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for the law-
yer."147 How does an attorney in O'Neal's position balance this
against the duty to zealously represent the client and protect
the client from cruel and unusual punishment? It has been sug-
gested that a solution is the appointment of a third attorney to
present evidence against the imposition of the death penalty.
148
Grasso fuels the controversy by contending that requiring
him to serve his New York sentence amounts to cruel and unu-
sual punishment. 49 He argues that forcing him to live in a
prison cell knowing that he will die, just not knowing when, vio-
lates his Eighth Amendment rights. 50 Governor Cuomo said of
Grasso, "He's asking for mercy, choosing what he sees as the
easier penalty."' 5' Who gets to choose and decide lies at the root
and heart of such unique legal questions. Moreover, the ethical
dimension adds great complexity, nuance and uncertainty that
fuels academic debate among professionals and institutions
charged with fair, orderly dispensation of justice.
The case of Rickey Ray Rector starkly illustrates many in-
equities and pitfalls of capital cases. Since none of the lawyers
in Conway, Arkansas wanted his case, Rector was represented
by an outside court-appointed attorney.152 After killing a police
officer, Rector shot himself in the head - effectively giving
himself a frontal lobotomy. 53 At the time of his trial, he had an
IQ of sixty-three. 54 Thus, the only issues were his ability to
of...." Id. Grasso did not change his mind; he merely requested that the Deputy
Public Defender not visit him again. Id.
147. N.Y. JuD. LAW app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1994).
148. Siegel, supra note 133, at 62.
149. Id. at 63.
150. Id. O'Neal maintains that it is hypocritical to keep Grasso alive through
years of appeals. He notes, "We've sentenced him to death.., and yet we won't let
him die quickly and with dignity." Id.
151. Ferguson, supra note 137, at A-i.
152. Marshall Frady, Death in Arkansas, NEW YORKER, Feb. 1993, at 112.
153. Id. at 105.
154. Id. at 113. After the shooting, Rector was unable to conceptualize beyond
immediate sensations or provocations. Id. at 111. He was unable to grasp the
concept of past or future and he did not understand the concept of death. Id. He
thought he would be back in his cell the next day. Id. at 105. He even saved his
1994]
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assist in his representation and his ability to comprehend that
he had been sentenced to death and why. Rector had two com-
petency hearings.155 The testimony was later described as
"hopelessly in conflict."15 6 Medical specialists testifying for the
defense contended that Rector was incapable of assisting his at-
torneys; a determination with which one of the State's special-
ists agreed. 157 The State's witnesses testified that Rector was
"attempting to fake psychopathology" and that his emotionless
state was a "life choice." 158 Rector was adjudged competent. It
took only fifteen minutes for the jury to convict him of
murder. 59
Rector's attorneys filed appeal after appeal. The federal
district court upheld the determination of competency on the
basis that since the proof was in conflict, the decision could not
be held clearly erroneous. 160 The determination of competence
was accorded a "presumption of correctness." 16' In effect, the
appeals courts concerned themselves only with the competency
of the legal proceedings - not of Rector. In 1983, an Arkansas
State Supreme Court Justice indicated that the circumstances
surrounding Rector's conviction may be grounds for clemency
and should be addressed to the Governor. 62 Rector was given
two clemency hearings - one to hear from him and one to hear
from those opposed to a commuted sentence. 63 The latter drew
dessert for later, as was his usual custom. Id. His behavior in his cell was, to say
the least, erratic and bizarre. He would dance around his cell, singing and laugh-
ing, or howling and barking like a dog. Id. at 105, 125. He was unable to concen-
trate on a single topic for any length of time. Id. at 113. Instead, he would change
the subject - asking a stream of irrelevant questions. Id. at 113-14.
155. Id. at 114.
156. Id. at 115.
157. Id. at 114. The State's specialist noted that Rector was "trying to do the
best he could on those tests." Id.
158. Id. at 115. Some of these witnesses had never read the surgeon's report
on Rector's operation after the shooting. Id. at 114. One had no idea how much
brain tissue had been removed. Id.
159. Id. at 115.
160. Id. at 117.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 120-21. Rector made only one simple statement on his own behalf:
"I don't want to die. I'll take life without if I can get it." Id. at 120. His attorney
had labored for two days to draw this statement out of him. With the exception of
this single, rehearsed statement, Rector showed no interest in the proceedings.
[Vol. 14: 1
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such a large turnout that it had to be relocated.1 It took the
Board only 35 minutes to receive testimony and vote, unani-
mously, that then-Governor Bill Clinton should not commute
Rector's sentence. 165
As the time of Rector's execution drew near, his attorneys
tried desperately to reach Governor Clinton, who was immersed
in his presidential campaign. They were deflected by his staff,
despite the fact that the Governor had returned from the cam-
paign trail in New Hampshire specifically to be available in his
State to deal with this matter. 166 One of Rector's attorneys, who
was on his way to witness the execution, finally reached the
Governor from a pay phone at a convenience store.1 67 But it was
unavailing - the then-Governor apparently placed final and
great weight on the clemency board's recommendation and the
fact that the federal district court had denied Rector's last
appeal.168
The limited resources and appeal rights of death row in-
mates impacts with singular vengeance and with the most de-
humanizing effect on the mentally ill. Many cases, including
Rickey Ray Rector's and Bobby Shaw's, demonstrate how at
least this category ought to be a fundamental and heightened
concern. Bobby Shaw, who was sentenced to death for killing a
prison guard in Missouri, is brain damaged and has schizophre-
nia, but he was never able to use his mental condition as a
defense. 169
When he wasn't laughing, joking and playing with the guards, he stared flatly
straight ahead. Id.
164. Id. at 121.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 123, 125. Rector's attorneys called Clinton every half-hour, but
were informed that the then-Governor was not available to speak to them. Id. at
125. Out of desperation, they began calling anyone they knew who might have
been able to get through to Clinton. Id.
167. Id. at 126-27.
168. Id.
169. James Willwerth, The Voices Told Him To Kill, TIME, June 7, 1993, at 46,
47. Schizophrenia is a genetic disease which is characterized by "hallucinations,
delusions, depression and disorderly thinking." Id. at 48. Shaw was serving a life
sentence for a prior murder when he killed the guard. Id. at 47. At his first mur-
der trial, the defense made only one motion - a standard motion for acquittal on
the grounds that the State had not proven its case. Despite his history of sudden
violent behavior, Shaw was placed in the vegetable cutting room, where he worked
with knives every day. In addition, "[hie was neither examined nor treated for
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At his trial, the judge refused to instruct the jury that they
could take his mental condition into account. 170 The psychia-
trist who examined Shaw for his trial later admitted that he
had misdiagnosed him.171 His disease was finally recognized by
the Missouri Department of Corrections in 1986.172 But it was
too late; his appeals had run out. As a result of the strict rules
for the introduction of new evidence into cases under appeal,
Shaw's best defense was never permitted inside the court-
room.173 In the eyes of the law, he was a normal, functioning
human being.
Shaw was scheduled to die by lethal injection on June 9,
1993 - thirteen years after being sentenced. 174 On June 2,
1993, Governor Carnahan, stating there was "little doubt" that
Shaw was mentally unfit for execution, 175 commuted his sen-
tence to life imprisonment without parole.176 The commutation
of his sentence unleased a hailstorm of criticism from correc-
tional officers and citizens. 177 It also brought pleas for a sys-
tem-wide reform so that individuals with a diminished mental
psychiatric illness." He had several psychotic incidents, and the guards asked that
he be transferred. Id. at 48. He was not. Shaw heard voices - several of them -
they told him to stab the guard. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. Dr. Parwatikar originally diagnosed Shaw as being "a mildly de-
pressed individual." His misdiagnosis stemmed from incomplete prison records
and poorly framed questions. Since schizophrenics often hide their symptoms, it
takes skillful questioning to identify the disease. Parwatikar asked Shaw if he
was having command hallucinations; Shaw said no. Shaw's pro bono attorney
brought in Georgetown neurologist Jonathan Pincus to interview Shaw. After
some unsuccessful questioning regarding whether or not Shaw heard voices that
were not there, Pincus asked Shaw, "Do you hear things that are there, but other
people don't hear?" This time he got an affirmative response. Id.
172. Id. at 49.
173. Id. Sean O'Brien, Shaw's pro bono attorney, noted: "Bobby's death sen-
tence is the product of a complete break down of the adversarial system. The true
defense in this case has never been inside a courtroom, and it never will be." Id.
174. Id. at 47-48. Shaw never asked for clemency or that his lawyers appeal
his case. Id. at 49.
175. Across the USA: News from Every State, USA TODAY, June 3, 1993, at 8A.
Carnahan, who supports the death penalty, stated that because Shaw's mental
illness, borderline retardation and possible brain damage were not presented to
the jury, "the sentence of death may be fundamentally unfair . . . ." Virginia
Young, Carnahan Commutes Killer's Death Sentence, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH,
June 3, 1993, at 1A.
176. Across the USA: News from Every State, supra note 175, at 8A.
177. Mike Dawson, Shaw's Reprieve Was Slap to Guards, ST. Louis PosT Dis-
PATCH, June 19, 1993, at 2B. But see Andrea Langton, Mentally Retarded Deserve
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capacity could not be executed. As Andrea Langton, the State
Death Penalty Abolition Coordinator for Amnesty Interna-
tional, said, "The punishment must fit the criminal as well as
the crime."178
At this juncture, I want to inject a few comments about the
mode of capital execution. In 1890, the electric chair was used
for the first time in the United States. 179 William Kemmler was
executed at Auburn Prison in upstate New York. 80 The New
York Times characterized this new method as "euthanasia by
electricity."' 8' After being convicted of murder in the first de-
gree, Kemmler appealed his death sentence directly to the
Court of Appeals. 8 2 He argued that the electric chair consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment. The Court of Appeals rec-
ognized that the "infliction of the death penalty in any manner
must necessarily be accompanied with, what might be consid-
ered in this age, some degree of cruelty .... "183 Despite this
acknowledgement, my antecedents on the court, whom I admire
and respect even beyond the demands of stare decisis, upheld
the use of the electric chair, finding that "the application of elec-
tricity to the vital parts of the human body, under such condi-
tions, and in the manner contemplated by the statute, must
Mercy, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, June 12, 1993, at 2B; Compassion, Not Revenge,
supra note 17, at 2B.
178. Langton, supra note 177, at 2B.
179. PREJEAN, supra note 6, at 18.
180. Id. Kemmler was convicted of murdering his common-law wife by strik-
ing her more than 20 times on the head, neck and shoulders with a hatchet. Peo-
ple v. Kemmler, 119 N.Y. 580, 581, 582, 24 N.E. 9, 9-10, affd, 136 U.S. 436 (1890);
John G. Leyden, Death in the Hot Seat: A Century of Electrocutions, WASH. POST,
Aug. 5, 1990, at D5.
181. PREJEAN', supra note 6, at 18. In upholding the New York State Court of
Appeals' decision that executions performed with the electric chair did not consti-
tute cruel and unusual punishment, the Supreme Court stated: "It is within easy
reach of the electrical science at this day to so generate and apply to the person of
the convict a current of electricity of such known and sufficient force as certainly to
produce instantaneous, and, therefore, painless, death." In re Kemmler, 136 U.S.
436, 443 (1890) (citing People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 7 N.Y.S. 813, 818 (Sup.
Ct. 1889)), quoted in PREJ.AN, supra note 6, at 18.
182. People ex rel. Kemmler v. Durston, 119 N.Y. 569, 570, 24 N.E. 6, 6 (1890).
Kemmler's trial commenced on May 6, 1889, just five and one-half weeks after the
crime. Leyden, supra note 180, at D5. He was convicted four days later. Id. "On
May 13, [1889,] he became the first man to be sentenced under New York's new
capital punishment law." Id. He was executed on August 6, 1889. Id.
183. Kemmler, 119 N.Y. at 577, 24 N.E. at 8.
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result in instantaneous and consequently in painless death."1 4
Two very interesting words!
Unfortunately for Kemmler - and the hundreds who suc-
ceeded him to New York's "Old Sparky" - theory and facile se-
mantics, and euphemistic assumptions embodied in those two
conclusory words, did not mesh with reality 85 On August 6,
1890, the first jolt of electricity sent through Kemmler's body
did not kill him. 186 His muscles tensed and his chest heaved,
causing the attending physician to shout, "Turn on the current
184. Id. at 579, 24 N.E. at 9 (emphasis added).
185. Throughout the last century, witnesses have rendered graphic descrip-
tions of electrocutions. A particularly grisly portrait was included in Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in Glass v. Louisiana:
[W]hen the switch is thrown, the condemned prisoner "cringes," "leaps," and
"'fights the straps with amazing strength.'" The hands turn red, then
white, and the cords of the neck stand out like steel bands. The prisoner's
limbs, fingers, tees, and face are severely contorted. The force of the electri-
cal current is so powerful that the prisoner's eyeballs sometimes pop out and
"rest on [his] cheeks." The prisoner often defecates, urinates, and vomits
blood and drool. "The body turns bright red as its temperature rises," and
the prisoner's "flesh swells and his skin stretches to the point of breaking."
Sometimes the prisoner catches on fire, particularly "if [he] perspires exces-
sively." Witnesses hear a loud and sustained sound "like bacon frying," and
"the sickly sweet smell of burning flesh" permeates the chamber .... [T]he
prisoner almost literally boils: "the temperature in the brain itself ap-
proaches the boiling point of water," and when the postelectrocution autopsy
is performed "the liver is so hot that doctors have said that it cannot be
touched by the human hand." The body frequently is badly burned and
disfigured.
Glass, 471 U.S. 1080, 1086-88 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari) (quoting Hearings on S. 1760 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law and
Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1968)
(statement of Clinton Duffy, former Warden of San Quentin); LEwis EDWARD
LAwEs, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING-SInG 170 (1928); CHARLES DUFF, A HANDBOOK ON
HANGING 119-20 (1974); Steven Tyler, Electrocution as a Spectator Sport, 2 FACT
47, 50-51 (Mar.-Apr. 1965); Gardner, Executions and Indignities - An Eighth
Amendment Assessment of Methods of Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST.
L.J. 96, 119 & n.164 (1978); Sol Rubin, The Supreme Court, Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, and the Death Penalty, 15 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 121, 128 (1969);
HuGo ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 16 (3d ed. 1982)).
186. Michael Kroll, The Chair Marks 100 Years of Ghastly Execution History,
OREGONIAN, Aug. 6, 1990, at B7. Accounts of Kemmler's death indicate that he
was the calmest person in the room. Leyden, supra note 180, at D5. When the
electrode was attached to his head, he suggested that the warden press it down
further so it would be tighter. The switch was thrown at 6:43 a.m. Despite the
attempts of the warden to keep the time of death a secret, scores of curious citizens
had gathered outside the prison as early as 4 a.m. Id.
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instantly, this man is not dead."187 A second jolt was adminis-
tered. 188 It killed him, but one witness is reported to have noted
that "t]hey could have done better with an axe . . ."189
A reporter for the New World newspaper recounted the
events of this historic "breakthrough" for finding a humane
method of execution in revolting detail:
The current had been passing through his body for 15 seconds
when the electrode at the head was removed. Suddenly the breast
heaved. There was a straining at the straps which bound him. A
purplish foam covered the lips and was spattered over the leather
head band. The man was alive.
Warden, physician, guards . . . everybody lost their wits.
There was a startled cry for the current to be turned on again....
An odor of burning flesh and singed hair filled the room, for a
moment, a blue flame played about the base of the victim's spine.
This time the electricity flowed four minutes .... 190
This inauspicious beginning - and from Kemmler's perspec-
tive, his ending - touched off a debate that has raged for over
100 years. After Kemmler's painful, extended execution, the
New York Press commented that "[t]he age of burning at the
stake is passed; the age of burning at the wire will pass also."' 9'
187. Kroll, supra note 186, at B7.
188. Id. The second jolt allegedly lasted 70 seconds. Id. However, according
to some reports, it lasted more than four minutes. Leyden, supra note 180, at D5;
P jEAN, supra note 6, at 18. The attending physicians waited three hours before
performing an autopsy to give the body time to cool down. Leyden, supra note 180,
at D5.
189. Kroll, supra note 186, at B7. The witness was George Westinghouse, the
great inventor and business tycoon. Leyden, supra note 180, at D5. Westinghouse
had unsuccessfully attempted "to prevent the use of his company's dynamos to
generate the electricity for [Kemmler's] execution." Id. He reportedly paid more
than $100,000 to finance Kemmler's appeal. Id. Ironically, after the first jolt was
administered, Dr. Alfred Porter Southwick, the inventor of the electric chair, had
commented, "We live in a higher civilization from this day .... " Kroll, supra note
186, at B7.
190. PREJEAN, supra note 6, at 18.
191. Kroll, supra note 186, at B7. George F. Shrady, editor of the Medical
Record of New York and an eyewitness to Kemmler's execution, wrote in an
editorial:
Although science has triumphed, the question of the humanity of the act is
still an open one .... We venture to predict that public opinion will soon
banish the death chair as it has done the rope, and imprisonment for life
will be the only proper punishment meted out to a murderer ....
Leyden, supra note 180, at D5.
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Well, not everywhere and not yet by a long shot. This country
seems to be moving against most of the civilized world's modern
currents that reject the death penalty.192 Advocates of the
death penalty remain unfazed. They argue that "pain and suf-
fering are part of the penalty."193 Opponents do not lobby stren-
uously for more humane methods, but for elimination
entirely. 94 I cannot help but wonder whether my predecessors
in office who decided the Kemmler case would find any solace in
the words "instantaneous" and "painless" today, based on what
experience has taught.
What, then, should the defense attorney's role be in this
part of the debate? Would a Brandeis Brief Approach 195 on the
Scientific-Medical-Forensic plane make some difference? Are
there defense resources to mount such an effort? Defense attor-
neys have an ethical obligation to represent their clients zeal-
ously and to insure that the punishment meted out to their
clients does not violate the Eighth Amendment. 196 Should this
special group bear the burden alone and band together to argue
for reform or just go about it one-by-one, case-by-case? Canon 8
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "[a]
192. Approximately 4,100 people have died in the electric chair since Kem-
mler was executed. Leyden, supra note 180, at D5.
193. Michael deCourcy Hinds, Making Execution Humane (or Can It Be?),
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990, at Al, A8.
194. Id. at A8. Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union contend
that lobbying for more humane methods would undercut their fundamental opposi-
tion to the death penalty. More humane methods would weaken their crusade by
defusing public outrage. "[D]octors generally stay out of the debate because their
oath requires them to save lives," not take them. Id. The American Medical Asso-
ciation explicitly limits a doctor's role in executions to a pronouncement that the
inmate is dead. Federal courts have dismissed appeals by defendants who argue
that a particular method is inhumane. In June of 1990, a federal judge in Orlando,
Florida, held: "The State is not required to employ the most modem state-of-the-
art technology in implementing the death penalty or to foresee and meet every
problem which conceivably ever could arise during an execution." Buenoano v.
Dugger, No. 90-473-CIV.-ORL-19, 1990 WL 119637, at *35 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (Faw-
sett, J.).
195. A Brandeis Brief is "[a] form of appellate brief in which economic and
social surveys and studies are included along with legal principles and citations
and which takes its name from Louis D. Brandeis, Associate Justice of Supreme
Court, who used such brief while practicing law." BLAciKs LAw DIcTIoNARY 188
(6th ed. 1990).
196. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1994).
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lawyer should assist in improving the legal system,"197 indicates
the answer: Defense lawyers, all lawyers, should do something.
Changes in human affairs and imperfections in human institu-
tions make necessary constant efforts to maintain and improve
our legal system. This system should function in a manner that
commands public respect and fosters the use of legal remedies to
achieve redresses of grievances. By reason of education and expe-
rience, lawyers are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in
the legal system and to initiate corrective measures therein. 198
This is generalized, idealized talk, to be sure, but without
an organized effort to level the playing and killing fields, at
least as to defense resources and personnel, the number of ex-
ecutions will continue to mount in this country and without the
consolation that all rights of all death penalty offenders have
been procedurally protected. The mood of the land is not good
and not conducive to reflective deliberations that take time and
money.
Yale Professor Stephen Carter notes the curious anomaly of
America's fixation with the death penalty in relation to its in-
ability to deal with serious crime. 199 He acknowledges the prob-
able facial constitutionality of the death penalty,200 and the
enormous as-applied difficulties in the given cases across this
great land. He deplores the political rhetoric, the public specta-
cle, the seeming glee. His proposal: let the religionists who op-
pose capital punishment keep up their steady drumbeat in the
public square, their prayerful candlelight vigils, all so that soci-
ety will be forced to look at, really look at, the human faces of
those it feels obliged to kill. Let the killings, he asserts, at the
very least, be "an occasion for sadness, not joy."201
Although a century has passed since Kemmler's execution
in New York, death by the electric chair is still a grisly affair. It
is not unusual for two or three jolts of electricity to be required
197. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8
(McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1994).
198. N.Y JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 8-1 (Mc-
Kinney 1992).
199. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW
AND POLrTIcs TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVoTION 258 (1993).
200. Id. at 259.
201. Id. at 262.
19941
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before an inmate is declared dead. 20 2 Seventeen-year-old Willie
Francis, who was executed in 1947 in Louisiana's portable elec-
tric chair, is still the only person ever to have survived an ear-
lier attempt that left him burned but alive. 203 Perhaps the most
well-known case is that of Jesse Tafero, 20 4 the 218th person to
be executed in Florida's "Old Sparky. 205 It took three jolts of up
to 2,000 volts of electricity each and seven minutes to kill
him.20 6 After the first jolt, "flames and smoke rose from [his]
head as the headset connecting him to the current caught
fire."20 7 Tafero continued to breathe, his chest heaving and
heart visibly palpitating, and nod slowly as the current was re-
peatedly turned on and off.208 Each time the switch was turned
on, "flames shot out and smoke rose from underneath the black
202. Bearak, supra note 61, at A15.
203. PREJEAN, supra note 6, at 19. When the first current of electricity was
administered, "witnesses reported that the youth's lips puffed out and he groaned
and jumped so that the chair came off the floor, and he said, 'Take it off, let me
breathe.'" Id. After several more jolts of electricity failed to kill him, Francis was
returned to his cell. Id.; see also A Friend in the Electric Chair, WASH. POST, July
22, 1989, at A22. The Governor set another execution date six days later. Id. An
appeal to the United States Supreme Court was unavailing. The Court ruled five
to four that there was nothing unconstitutional about subjecting a man, who has
had his head shaved, been strapped into an electric chair and severely shocked and
burned, to the ordeal a second time. State ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459, 463-64. On May 8, 1947, Francis was returned to the electric chair and this
time the State achieved its end, PRFJEAN, supra note 6, at 19 (citing ARTHUR S.
MILLER & JEFFREY H. MILLER, DEATH By INSTALLMENTS: THE DEATH OF WILLIE
FRANcIs (1989)), giving new meaning to the term double jeopardy.
204. Tafero was convicted of the 1976 murder of two Florida police officers.
Larry Keller, Foes Call Execution Cruel, Unusual Torture, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lau-
derdale), May 5, 1990, at 1A. He was executed on May 4, 1990 - fourteen years,
two months and two days later. Electric Chair Shoots Flames During Execution in
Florida, DETROrr FREE PRESS, May 5, 1990, at 4A [hereinafter Electric Chair
Shoots Flames].
205. Bearak, supra note 61, at A15. "Old Sparky" is the three-legged oak elec-
tric chair that Florida has used since 1924. Id. It was built in 1923 by inmates.
Keller, supra note 204, at 4A. It does not have an affixed head piece. Bearak,
supra note 61, at A15. Instead, the condemned wears a detachable leather skull
cap with wire mesh underneath. A sponge soaked in conductor is sewn to the
mesh. The cap is then attached to the power source with a nut and bolt. After the
condemned is strapped tightly to the chair, a gag is inserted in the mouth and a
second electrode is fastened to the right calf. The power surge causes a slight
burning at the points of connection. Red spots on the scalp and legs are expected.
Id.
206. Keller, supra note 204, at 1A; McGarrahan, supra note 61, at 6B.
207. Electric Chair Shoots Flames, supra note 204, at 4A.
208. Keller, supra note 204, at 1A.
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol14/iss1/1
1994] ETHICAL IMPULSES
mask covering his face."209 The Florida Department of Correc-
tions attributed the incident to "a fault in the head piece ... ." 210
A brine-soaked synthetic sponge was used instead of a natural
sponge.211 That it was essentially human error is of little com-
fort to Tafero - or to other death row inmates.212
The execution of Tafero has led to proposals that Florida
change its method of execution to lethal injection.213 By 1990,
sixteen states, including Texas and Louisiana, had adopted le-
thal injection as their mode of execution. 214 Maryland is cur-
rently considering switching from the gas chamber to lethal
injection. It is touted as being quick, easy and more humane. 218
However, there is some evidence to the contrary. "[E]xtreme
pain can result if an unskilled technician injects the chemicals
into muscle tissue rather than veins, or if the chemicals are
given in the wrong order or [the wrong] dosage."216 Raymond
Landry was strapped to a gurney for forty minutes, while execu-
tioners repeatedly probed his veins with syringes trying to in-
ject a lethal dose of potassium chloride. 217 In January of this
209. Electric Chair Shoots Flames, supra note 204, at 4A.
210. Id.
211. Bearak, supra note 61, at A15.
212. Tafero was not the first condemned man to be tortured during his execu-
tion. In 1983, John Evans was executed in Alabama. Kroll, supra note 186 at B7.
The first jolt caused flames to "burst from the electrode attached to his leg." Two
more jolts were necessary to kill him. It took 14 minutes to kill him, throughout
which his heart continued to beat. The three jolts left his body charred and smok-
ing. In Georgia in 1984, Alpha Otis Stephens "struggled for eight minutes after
the first jolt failed to kill him.... " Id. His body had to cool for six minutes before
the second lethal jolt could be administered. Id. It took two jolts of electricity,
administered nine minutes apart, to kill Horace Dunkins, Jr. A Friend in the Elec-
tric Chair, supra note 203, at A22. The first jolt rendered him unconscious, but he
still had a strong heartbeat. Bad Wiring Interrupts Execution, DETROIT FREE
PREss, July 15, 1989, at 1A. A guard in the witness room opened the door to the
death chamber and told them they had the "jacks on wrong." Alabama Execution
Required Two Tries, WASH. PosT, July 15, 1989, at A5. The faulty electrical con-
nection was fixed and the lethal jolt thrown nine minutes later. He was pro-
nounced dead 10 minutes later. Id. All told, it took 19 minutes to kill him. Kroll,
supra note 186, at B7.
213. Bearak, supra note 61, at A15.
214. Kroll, supra note 186, at B7.
215. Id.
216. Hinds, supra note 193, at A8.
217. Kroll, supra note 186, at B7. The first syringe came out of his arm unex-
pectedly, "spraying [potassium chloride] across the room toward witnesses." Id.
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year, Rickey Ray Rector was executed in Arkansas.218 It took a
full hour to find a serviceable vein in his arm.219
A few states still employ more "traditional" methods. For
instance, Utah and Idaho use firing squads.220 Washington,
Montana, Delaware, and New Hampshire use the gallows.221
But hangmen are hard to find. The only known experienced
hangman is a backwoodsman in Canada.222 He "has not re-
sponded to notes left on a tree stump for him by the local au-
thorities."223 No wonder!
Conclusion
The Code of Professional Responsibility aspires to en-
courage all lawyers to fulfill the distinctive, central responsibil-
218. Frady, supra note 152, at 130.
219. Id. at 129-30. Witnesses could hear periodic slaps and sudden groans.
The medical crew was increased from two to five in an effort to find a vein that
would not wilt at the needle's insertion. Rector is reported to have tried to help his
executioners locate a serviceable vein. Id. at 129-130. The medical crew went so
far as to slash the crook of his arm with a scalpel to find a useable vein. Id. at 130.
During the hour, Rector was heard to cry out eight times. After a vein was found,
the curtains were opened. Rector was lying on a gurney, staring dully into the
middle of the room. Id. at 130-31. After a few moments, he closed his eyes; then
his mouth sagged as he gasped for air. Id. at 131. Nineteen minutes after the
injection, he was declared dead. Id.
220. Hinds, supra note 193, at A8.
221. PREJEAN, supra note 6, at 217 n.*; see also John K Wiley, Delaying
Hanging Crueler Than Death, Lawyer Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan.
5, 1993, at A4; Preparations for Hanging by the Book, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orle-
ans), Jan. 5, 1993, at A4. Hanging is an art, not a science. Even when performed
properly, it is arguably inhumane. When performed improperly, there is no doubt.
It is well known that "too much rope can cause decapitation and too little rope will
not snap the spinal cord, leaving the condemned to strangle slowly." Hinds, supra
note 193, at Al. On January 5, 1993, the State of Washington hung triple child-
killer Westley Allan Dodd. PREi.JEN, supra note 6, at 217 n.*. The instructions
specified the use of a:
thirty-foot Manila hemp rope 3/4-to-1 1/4 inches in diameter which is boiled
to eliminate stiffness and lubricated with wax, soap, or oil to ensure tight-
ness when the noose is placed around the neck.... [T]he distance a stand-
ing person must fall to generate enough force so that the knot breaks the
spine depends on weight. For Dodd, that was calculated at 7 feet, 1 inch. If
the condemned feels faint while waiting for the trapdoor to be sprung, "a
board with straps is nearby to prop him [or her] up."
PREIJEAN, supra note 6, at 217 n.*; see also Wiley, supra, at A4; Preparations for
Hanging by the Book, supra, at A4.
222. Hinds, supra note 193, at Al.
223. Id.
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ity of providing "necessary legal services" to everyone by
"support" and participation. 224 That high responsibility, which
is so integral a part of the gift and opportunity of members of an
exclusively licensed public profession, rings feeble when mea-
sured against what is occurring in the defense of death row cli-
ents who need adequate legal services as uniquely and
desperately as anyone.
My personal opinion is that the Constitution of the United
States and the State can be read to support the checks-and-bal-
ances' democratic notion that Legislatures and Congress and
Governors and Presidents can fashion death penalty statutes
that may pass the scrutiny of facial constitutional muster. But
I believe equally strongly that the legal profession - and it
should not be principally the government's job - has not done
what it is obligated to do to insure proportionality, in the re-
sources-personnel sense, in providing adequate and necessary
legal services in death penalty cases. Thus, despite my opening
disclaimer, I recognize that my strong words may lead some un-
derstandably to conclude that I am against the death penalty.
But that would be a wrong impression and inference. I resist
forming or articulating a pro or con view with respect to the
simplistic proposition, "Are you for or against the death pen-
alty?" The core issue and its orbiting subsidiaries are too com-
plex and subtle for that. Thus, I leave poll-takers to their tallies
and superficial observers to their labelling exercises. My
nuanced passion is directed at the authentic lawyers' profes-
sional and ethical responsibilities.
During the civil rights movement of the fifties and espe-
cially the sixties, many inspired attorneys, not all idealistic neo-
phytes, travelled, often at great personal expense and real risk,
including their own deaths, to make a difference. That spirit
needs revival. Right now, it motivates too few. Those rightly
motivated should be commended for what they are trying to do.
But the ideal has not actuated or activated a sufficient number
of people in the legal profession to do their collective best. Until
that conversion occurs, Lady Justice may as well keep her eyes
blindfolded so as not to notice with shame the grotesque imbal-
224. N.Y. JuD. LAw app., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-16 (Mc-
Kinney 1992).
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ance in the scales of justice that hang from her fingertips, due to
the growing numbers of death penalty cases in this great coun-
try that are finally, really finally, resolved under such dispro-
portionate odds and resources. Lives may end, but the issue
will not die.
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